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Abstract
In mixed strategy 2×2 population games, the realization of maximum en-
tropy (Maxent) is of the theoretical expectation. We evaluate this theoretical
prediction in the experimental economics game data. The data includes 12
treatments and 108 experimental sessions in which the random match human
subjects pairs make simultaneous strategy moves repeated 200 rounds. Main
results are (1) We confirm that experimental entropy value fit the prediction
from Maxent well; and (2) In small proportion samples, distributions are de-
viated from Maxent expectations; interesting is that, the deviated patterns
are significant more concentrated. These experimental finding could enhance
the understanding of social game behavior with the natural science rule —
Maxent.
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1. Introduction1
The principle of Maxent is introduced by Jaynes [1]. By capture the2
symmetry in stochastic behaviors, Maxent methodology can provide rich in-3
formation basing on very limit information [2, 3]. Maxent has gained its wide4
applications in natural science and engineering. In social science, Maxent ap-5
proach has also gained its applications, e.g., to prove the existence of market6
equilibrium [4, 5], to investigate wealth and income distribution [6, 7], to7
explore firm growth rates [8] and to build fundamental behavior model [3].8
Theoretical interpreting or modeling of the distributions of social outcomes9
with Maxent is growing.10
Considering the importance of Maxent in social interaction systems, ex-11
perimental investigation this fundamental rule is necessary [9]. Only quite12
recently, entropy is firstly measured out in experiments to evaluate social13
outcomes by Bednar et.al. [10] and Cason et.al. [11]; Then, Xu. et.al [12]14
find that fixed-paired two-person constant-sum 2×2 games obey Maxent [12].15
These are the only experimental works, to the best of our knowledge, relates16
to entropy or Maxent till now.17
Comparing with fixed-paired games, population games are more general18
models for social behavior [13]. Investigating Maxent in population game is19
expected because: (1) Maxent lacks of least experimental population games20
supporting; (2) The experimental precision of Maxent in fundamental exper-21
iments in unclear. Robustness experimental results could be the references22
for future investigations relates to Maxent — a hub in interdisciplinary.23
The main aim of this paper is testing Maxent in experimental popula-24
tion 2×2 games. Randomizing and independence in mixed strategy systems25
is game theoretician expectation [14], meanwhile, randomizing and indepen-26
dence will lead to the realization of Maxent [15]. In an ideal (explanations27
see Section 2.1) mixed strategy experimental data set from ref. [16], we find28
that (1) experimental entropy values fit the predictions from Maxent well;29
and (2) whenever the experimental distributions are deviated from Maxent30
predictions, the deviated distribution patterns are concentrated significant.31
Quantitatively, this report provides the precision of Maxent in experimental32
economics systems.33
This report is organized as following. In next section the fundamental 234
by 2 games experiments are reviewed, meanwhile, the reasons for the choosing35
of this data set are given. In 3rd session, the experimentrics for entropy and36
distribution, calculation for Maxent expectations and approximate criterion37
3
are explained. Results are reported in 4th section. Then, the experimet-38
rics and the implication of our finding on Maxent are discussed briefly and39
conclusion last.40
2. Experiments, Data and Presentation41
2.1. Experiments and Data42
Mixed strategy 2×2 game is one of the most fundamental and the sim-43
plest game used widely from student textbooks to frontier research in inter-44
disciplinary. To investigate the performance of Maxent in human subjects45
social interaction systems, using this kind of experimental game data to is46
natural. The data we use in this report comes from Selten and Chmura’s47
experiments [16].48
The experiments contain 12 games, 6 constant sum games, and 6 noncon-49
stant sum games. Games were run with 12 independent subject groups for50
each constant sum game and 6 independent subject groups for each noncon-51
stant sum game. Each independent subject group consisted of four players X52
and four players Y , interacting anonymously over 200 periods with random53
matching. There were 864 student subjects of the University of Bonn alto-54
gether used in these experiments. All of the game are of unique mixed strat-55
egy Nash equilibrium systems. In a session with 200 round, the distribution56
is suggested to be stationary. In experimetrics view, in these experiments,57
the treatment sample number is 12 at treatment level, and the group sample58
number is 108 at session (group) level. At each experimental round, the 859
individual records can be combined as a social outcome of this round; So in a60
session, there are 200 observations in strategy space in which the distribution61
can be estimated.62
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of 2× 2 Games
Y1 Y2
X1 a11, b11 a12, b12
X2 a21, b21 a22, b22
The reasons to choose this data set are (1) The games being mixed strat-63
egy, so randomization and independence social outcomes can be expected.64
(2) The unique equilibrium, so each sample has its own observation mean;65
(3) The variety of the experimental parameters, so the results less bias; (4)66
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Figure 1: Presentation of the social states lattices and distribution. (Left) A social state
which means one in the four agents in X-population uses X1, meanwhile three out of the
four agents in Y use Y1. The degree of degenerate is 16 (see the interpretation for Eq. 4).
(Middle) Experimental distribution, data from the Game-3 with 2400 observations, red
star is the mean observation (O¯) [16]. (Right) Theoretical distribution from Maxent with
the red star (O¯) servicing as the given constraints for the Game-3 [16]. Numerical labels
are the observations.
Sufficient samples for there are 108 groups samples, so the confidence of the67
results could be expected; (5) The distribution of mixed strategy Nash equi-68
librium in strategy space is uniform, so the samples from the data could also69
be less bias for evaluating social performance. These characters make this70
data set to be ideal and the unique for Maxent investigation.71
As subjects (Players X or players Y ) do not change their roles in a game,72
subjects in each role can be modeled as a population. So, these games can be73
regarded as two-population games. Supposing for the first population X , the74
strategy set is {X1, X2} for each agent; similarly, in the second population Y ,75
{Y1,Y2}. The payoff matrix for the 12 games can be presented mathematically76
in Table 1 in which, in each cell, the numeric in left (right) is the payoff for77
the agent from the player from X (Y ). For the 12 treatments, the payoff78
matrix cells are shown in column 2-5 in Table 2 referring to Table 1.79
2.2. Presentation of Social State80
A two-population game’s outcomes can be presented in a unit square81
strategy space [17, 18] or in a discrete state lattice [19, 20]. If there are 482
agents in each of the two population (N=4), an observed instantaneous state83
should be x:=( i
N
, j
N
) ∈ X, herein X is the populations strategy state space84
and X={0, 1
4
, 2
4
, 3
4
, 1} ⊗ {0, 1
4
, 2
4
, 3
4
, 1}, and i
N
( j
N
) is the density of X1 (Y1) in85
X (Y ). Figure 2.2 (left) is an illustration of the space and the states. The86
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unit square 5×5 lattice (gray dots) is the space X. Dots are states. For87
example, the dot xA=(
1
4
, 3
4
) is a state.88
At each round, one observation is gained. So in data, for each treatment89
1-6 (7-12) there are 2400 (1200) observations; For each group there are 20090
observations. All observations distribute in the 25 dots lattice.91
Motivation of using social state presentation is in two aspects. First,92
instead of concern the diversity of individual behavior, we concern the per-93
formance of social outcomes more [17, 18, 21, 13]. And second, in this pre-94
sentation, significant more observations can be harvested from experiment95
so the regular of social behavior can he evaluated. In sequential strategy96
presentation, there are 28 states in above experiments; meanwhile, in social97
state presentation, it is 25 states.98
3. Measurement and Criterion99
3.1. Measurement100
Experimental distribution (Oij) at state (
i
N
, j
N
) can be obtained in data.101
Every experimental round, an observation is gained in one state in the 5×5102
lattice. The distribution Oij can be obtained by pooling up all observations103
from the experimental rounds. For example, in Fig. 2.2(middle), state-(1
4
, 3
4
)104
is labeled as 466 means O( 1
4
, 3
4
)=446. In normalized form, density of state105
ρij can be calculated as ρij := Oij/T in which T is the total experimental106
rounds.107
The entropy (S) can be calculated with a given distribution. Recall that,108
the original metric for entropy is109
S = −
∑
k
ρ(k) logγ ρ(k), (1)
in which k is an element in the individual sequential states set whose in-110
dependent element number is 28; and γ is the potential information in one111
fundamental observation [22]. This point differs from ref. [10, 11] and should112
be discussed last paragraph in Section 5.1. In social state presentation, the113
entropy can be expressed as114
S = −
∑
ij
[ρij logγ ρij − ρij logγ Dij ]; (2)
here, Dij is the degeneracy of state (
i
N
, j
N
) and its arthogram sees the inter-115
preting of Eq 4.116
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Experimental mean observation (O¯) can be calculated from (Oij) as117
O¯ =
∑
ij
ρij(
i
N
eˆp +
j
N
eˆq) (3)
in which ρij is the density of state at (
i
N
, j
N
) and (eˆp, eˆq) are the two unit118
vectors. O¯ is a 2-dimensional vector and could be presented as (O¯p, O¯q) who119
server as constraint conditions, which is most often used [23], for Maxent120
estimation.121
3.2. Theoretical expectation122
Maxent requires that the noise process be assigned a binomial distribution123
in discrete case, independent and identically distributed — this describes our124
state of knowledge about the noise [15]. The theoretical expected distribution125
(Eij) at the state (
i
N
, j
N
), with the experimental mean observation (O¯), can126
be calculated as [15]127
Eij = C
i
NC
j
NO¯
i
p(1− O¯p)
N−iO¯jq(1− O¯q)
N−j , (4)
in which N is the population size (N=4 in our case), CkN is binomial coef-128
ficient and C iNC
j
N is the degree of degenerate (denoted as Dij above) of the129
state; For example, at xA in Fig. 2.2(left), D( 1
4
, 3
4
) is C
1
4C
3
4=16. Now, with130
Eq. 2 and Eq. 4, theoretical expected entropy (St) can be obtained.131
3.3. Approximate estimators of the goodness of fit of Maxent132
On entropy view, the approximate criterion to test the goodness of Jaynes133
Maxent prediction is the entropy concentration theorem (ECT). The theorem134
states that out of all distributions that satisfy the observed data (moments), a135
significantly large portion of these distributions are concentrated sufficiently136
close to the one of maximum entropy [24, 2]. The measured entropy from137
experiment Se can be expressed as [24]138
St −△S ≤ Se ≤ St, (5)
in which St is evaluated from Maxent; Meanwhile, △S can be calculated by139
2M△S = χ2k(1− F ), (6)
in which (1 − F ) is the upper tail area (denoted as p := 1 − F called as140
statistical significant index); k = n − 2 − 1 is the degrees of freedom in141
7
which the 2 is the constrained freedoms due to O¯ (the experimental mean142
observation), n=25 is the number of the social states, and then the freedom143
in the experiments are of 22. From χ2 table, χ222(1 − 0.95) is 33.92. So144
the △S values are of 0.0071, 0.0141 and 0.0848 for the Treatment 1-6 game145
(M=2400) conditions, the Treatment 7-12 game (M=1200) conditions and146
the 108 group (M=200) condition, respectively.147
On distribution view, the χ2 goodness of fit test is used to summarize the148
discrepancy; The χ2 statistic is149
χ2 =
∑
i∈S
(Oij −Eij)
2
Eij
; (7)
Here Oij (Eij) is the experimental (theoretical) distribution and is given by150
Eq. 2 (Eq. 4).151
One point needs to emphasis. Theoretically, both of the criterion above152
for Maxent are indirectly statistical methods, or saying, both of the crite-153
rion have its shortcoming facing experimental economics condition. In the154
theoretical derivation of △S, the deviate rate of observe from theoretical155
expected rate needs to be sufficient small and so high order term can be ig-156
nored. However, in the edges of the 25 social states lattice, the experimental157
observation is rare. Practically, the requirement of the sufficient small can158
not be satisfied. On the other side, the χ2 goodness of fit test is not valid159
if the expected frequencies are too small. There is no general agreement on160
the minimum expected frequency allowed, even though values of 5 are often161
used. However, in the edge of the strategy lattice, to gain 5 observations is162
not easy especially for the mean observation closes to the edge of the lattice.163
It is a dilemma, if the few observed state are pooled, the good performance of164
the theoretical prediction on these states is hidden, the degree of freedom is165
lower. So we call above two criterions as approximate estimators for Maxent166
in these experimental conditions.167
4. Results168
To test the fit within the Maxent expectations and the experimental re-169
sults, the two observable (1) entropy and (2) distribution are used. Results170
and the supporting materials are reported following.171
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4.1. Experimental Entropy and Precision of Maxent prediction172
Experimental entropy values can be calculated from the experimental173
distribution (Eq. 2). Meanwhile, the theoretical entropy can be calculated174
using the mean observation (O¯) and Eq. 2 with Eq. 4.175
Figural results for eye guide, shown in Figure 4.1, demonstrates the pre-176
cision of the Maxent prediction meet the experimental entropy values in177
treatment level (12 samples, left) and group level (108 samples, right).178
Numerical results of the accuracy for the 108 sessions is shown in Table 3;179
The proportion of the deviation Dt−e (Dt−e := 1 −
Se
St
) are listed along the180
treatment and group (in T-G columns). Directly statistical results for the181
deviation entropy (Dt−e) are group by treatment is shown in Table 2. So,182
we comes to the conclusion that, prediction of the Maxent suggestion is183
supported in experimental economics data at accuracy about 0.020 ± 0.002184
level (see the last raw in Table 2). In words, in view of entropy values in the185
samples, the experimental entropy meets the Maxent prediction well.186
Table 2: Payoff matrix and the Deviation of Se from St of 12 Treatments
T-Gs a11, b11 a12, b12 a21, b21 a22, b22 Mean S.E. [99% c.i.]
1, 12 10, 8 0, 18 9, 9 10, 8 0.030 0.009 0.008, 0.052
2, 12 9, 4 0, 13 6, 7 8, 5 0.017 0.003 0.011, 0.024
3, 12 8, 6 0, 14 7, 7 10, 4 0.024 0.006 0.009, 0.038
4, 12 7, 4 0, 11 5, 6 9, 2 0.011 0.001 0.009, 0.014
5, 12 7, 2 0, 9 4, 5 8, 1 0.017 0.005 0.005, 0.029
6, 12 7, 1 1, 7 3, 5 8, 0 0.015 0.003 0.008, 0.022
7, 6 10, 12 4, 22 9, 9 14, 8 0.037 0.013 0.003, 0.071
8, 6 9, 7 3, 16 6, 7 11, 5 0.016 0.002 0.011, 0.020
9, 6 8, 9 3, 17 7, 7 13, 4 0.013 0.003 0.006, 0.021
10, 6 7, 6 2, 13 5, 6 11, 2 0.023 0.006 0.008, 0.038
11, 6 7, 4 2, 11 4, 5 10, 1 0.013 0.002 0.009, 0.017
12, 6 7, 3 3, 9 3, 5 10, 0 0.019 0.007 0.002, 0.037
Total 0.020 0.002 0.015, 0.023
A theoretical approximate estimation of the low-bound of experimental187
entropy (Se) is in Eq. 6. Using △S (:= St − Se) from these 108 experimen-188
tal sessions as samples, the mean deviation (△S) from Maxent is 0.0158,189
the standard error is 0.0012 and the 99% confident interval (c.i.) is be-190
tween [0.0125 0.0190]. Calculated from Jaynes ECT (Eq. 6), the criterion191
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of up bound of △S = 0.0848 which is large than up bound of the 99% c.i.192
significant. This approximate estimation supports above result that the ex-193
perimental entropy meets the Maxent prediction well.194
Table 3: Deviation (Dt−e:=1-Se/St) of Entropy at Group Level
T-G Dt−e T-G Dt−e T-G Dt−e T-G Dt−e T-G Dt−e T-G Dt−e
1-1 .042 2-7 .03 4-1 .01 5-7 .066 7-1 .098 10-1 .025
1-2 .062 2-8 .006 4-2 .012 5-8 .013 7-2 .013 10-2 .018
1-3 .012 2-9 .009 4-3 .012 5-9 .022 7-3 .016 10-3 .05
1-4 .009 2-10 .012 4-4 .01 5-10 .017 7-4 .022 10-4 .018
1-5 .024 2-11 .022 4-5 .009 5-11 .009 7-5 .032 10-5 .018
1-6 .007 2-12 .017 4-6 .022 5-12 .010 7-6 .04 10-6 .01
1-7 .012 3-1 .033 4-7 .009 6-1 .009 8-1 .017 11-1 .018
1-8 .023 3-2 .015 4-8 .013 6-2 .009 8-2 .013 11-2 .014
1-9 .015 3-3 .025 4-9 .011 6-3 .016 8-3 .016 11-3 .010
1-10 .110 3-4 .007 4-10 .008 6-4 .014 8-4 .009 11-4 .009
1-11 .016 3-5 .008 4-11 .011 6-5 .010 8-5 .021 11-5 .017
1-12 .027 3-6 .012 4-12 .01 6-6 .010 8-6 .019 11-6 .012
2-1 .016 3-7 .006 5-1 .011 6-7 .012 9-1 .01 12-1 .015
2-2 .016 3-8 .007 5-2 .013 6-8 .022 9-2 .017 12-2 .013
2-3 .005 3-9 .014 5-3 .01 6-9 .011 9-3 .004 12-3 .014
2-4 .031 3-10 .056 5-4 .013 6-10 .041 9-4 .011 12-4 .011
2-5 .016 3-11 .043 5-5 .01 6-11 .015 9-5 .023 12-5 .011
2-6 .029 3-12 .059 5-6 .013 6-12 .012 9-6 .016 12-6 .053
4.2. Distribution and Deviation Pattern195
Distribution (Oij) and the mean observation O¯ in an experimental session196
data can be obtained (Eq. 3). In the unit square of strategy lattics, for197
example, the size of the yellow cycles in figure 4.2 indicates the experimental198
distribution (Oij) and the red star indicates the O¯ vector for a session; using199
this O¯, theoretical distribution (Eij) for a session can be evaluated (Eq. 4)200
directly.201
An indirect method is used to evaluate the deviation of experimental202
distribution from Maxent predictions. Using Eq.7 the χ2 for each group can203
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Figure 2: Experimental entropy (in vertical) vs Maxent theoretical expectation of the
entropy (in horizon) in treatment level (left) and in group level (right). Legend indicate
the 12 treatments (from Game 1 to Game 12 referring to ref [16] respectively). The thin
dash indicates the theoretical low-bound of Se calculated by Eq. 6.
be obtained. We use χ222(1−0.95)=33.92 as approximation criterion, in total204
108 group, there are 27 groups whose χ2 is larger than 33.92.205
Figure 4.2 presents the distribution and deviation of the whole 27 groups.206
Each of the sub-plot presents a given T-G (treatment-group) group. Results207
of the distribution (Oij) are in yellow; Meanwhile, the positive deviation208
(Oij−Eij>0) is plotted in red, alternatively, the negative deviation is (Oij−209
Eij<0) in blue. And the number in brackets (Z) is the results of the sum of210
distance of the deviation of distribution in which Z:=
∑
ij |xij−O¯|(Eij−Oij).211
Statistically, Z smaller than 0 (p < 0.001, t-test and H0: Z=0). This means212
that, when the Maxent prediction is deviation, on the contrary to more tire-213
like shape, the binomial bell is, in statistical significant, more sharper.214
5. Discussion and Conclusion215
Maxent has being developed since 1970s to interpret or model the social216
outcome distributions [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 3, 2]. This report provides, firstly, the lab-217
oratory population 2×2 games supporting Maxent (shown in Fig. 4.1). The218
precision of Maxent prediction on entropy values in the fundamental exper-219
imental games comes up to 2%. When experimental distribution is slightly220
deviates from Maxent prediction, the residual pattern is concentrated signifi-221
11
1−1(−12.2) 1−2(−12.3) 1−10(−14.6) 1−12(−5.1) 2−4(−13.8) 2−6(−8.7)
2−7(−12.2) 2−11(−11) 3−1(−2.4) 3−2(−1.3) 3−3(−4.8) 3−10(−11.4)
3−11(−7.8) 3−12(−14.2) 4−6(−4.7) 5−7(−7.9) 6−10(−13.3) 7−1(−19.4)
7−4(−6.1) 7−5(5) 7−6(−10.8) 8−1(3.2) 8−6(−4.4) 10−1(−7.3)
10−3(−11.2) 10−4(3.1) 12−6(−18.5)
Figure 3: Pattern of the deviation (Oij − Eij). Size of the red (blue) cycles indicates
the positive (negative) deviation (enlarged 5 times for visible). Size of the yellow cycles
indicates the experimental observation Oij . In titles, on the three index X-Y(Z), X is
Game.ID., Y is Group.ID, And (Z), the number in brackets, is results of the sum of
deviation.
cant (shown in Fig. 4.2). Before interpreting the theoretical and experimental222
implication, we discuss the experimetric used above.223
5.1. Experimetric Technologies224
In social state presentation, the sequential states, whose social propor-225
tions are same, is pooled to one social states. This presentation has been226
widely used for investigate social evolution [17, 18, 21, 13, 19, 20]. Our in-227
vestigations are base on this presentation. On the other side, our results228
have to be strictly constricted on social outcomes, instead of saying that the229
individual behavior in the games satisfied Maxent.230
Two approximate technologies is used in this report. First is the using of231
the Jaynes concentration theorem. Indeed we use the△S as a approximation232
(the dash lines in Figure 4.1 as a eye guide), but the results of Maxent233
well fitted do not relay on the theorem (as explained in last paragraph in234
Section 3). The results of Maxent well fitted mainly based on the directly235
measurement results shown in Table 2 and Table 3. Second is the using of236
χ2 goodness of fit approximation to filter out more bias samples. This filter237
12
out method mainly base on the χ2 value and larger χ2 means more deviate238
from binomial. So, this method do not effect the existence of the sharper-239
than-binomial pattern in the groups. So, our main results mainly base on240
the directly measurements (Table 2, Table 3 and Fig. 3) instead of relaying241
on the two approximate statistical technologies.242
On experimetrics for entropy in Eq. 2, the root (γ) is not 2 as ref. [10,243
11, 12]. We strictly fellow ref. [22] in which the root is the number of all244
microstate in a device. We set γ=28 because for each of the 8 subjects has245
its own two options, the information in this social device is 8-bit. In this246
way, S has it natural interval [0, 1], and more important, different games can247
have comparable interval.248
5.2. Implication on Theory249
In mixed strategy game, randomizing using each pure strategy in a certain250
proportion and playing independent — these are the fundamental prediction251
of game theory [14]. Meanwhile, in randomization and independence behav-252
iors system, Maxent is a promising [15] or as a prior [3]. Using human subjects253
data, this report makes these two fundamental predictions meet. The finding254
demonstrates that social behavior could have common background as natural255
science.256
Maxent could help for game theory. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is257
remarkably supported in experiments [21, 18]. However, the mixing is still258
problem (e.g., Ch.6 [25]). Proposal are are developed — like purification [26],259
population (people play the same game with different players over time and260
a mixed strategy is just a distribution of different pure strategies in popula-261
tion), and randomization device (players are playing a pure strategy based262
on some randomization device), and so on. Facing these proposal, a naive263
directly suggestion is, at least in the 2×2 games, randomization device pro-264
posal (for Maxent is mainly supported in data) is dominate; on the contrary,265
the population proposal is significant less supported.266
5.3. Implication in Experimental Economics267
Entropy measurement has been shown its useful, e.g., ditinguishing the268
coordination in games [11, 10]. The Maxent methods provides a accuracy way269
to detect distribution. For example, in the experiments of testing a funda-270
mental concept of evolutionary game theory [20], we expect, the deviation of271
the distribution from Nash (in random and independent hypothesis) could be272
13
measured out by Maxent method (using the equations in Section 3). Mean-273
while, non-trivial white noise (non-gaussian) phenomena has its extremely274
interested in theories from multidisciplines [27, 28]. The experimental Max-275
ent distributions could be an encouragement for the experiments on behavior276
noise.277
We notice that, Maxent methods are not well known in experimental278
economics. Our finding suggests that, referring to Maxent prediction, to test279
the entropy and distribution of experimental social outcomes is a practical280
way.281
5.4. Summary282
This report provides firstly experimental evidence of supporting Maxent283
in 2×2 population games. The report includes also the precision and the284
deviation pattern of the experimental social outcomes meet Maxent predic-285
tions. We wish our experimental finding could strength the bridges from286
game theory to Maxent and to general science.287
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